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The terms 'quality-of-life', 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote different meanings; sometimes they 
are used as an umbrella term for all of value, and the other times to denote special merits.  
 This paper is about the specific meanings of the terms. It proposes a classification based 
on two bi-partitions; between life 'chances' and life 'results', and between 'outer' and 'inner' 
qualities. Together these dichotomies imply four qualities of life: 1) livability of the environment, 
2) life-ability of the individual, 3) external utility of life and 4) inner appreciation of life.  
 This fourfold matrix is applied in three ways: firstly to place related notions and 
alternative classifications, secondly to explore substantive meanings in various measures for 
quality of life and thirdly to find out whether quality-of-life can be measured comprehensively. 
This last question is answered in the negative. Current sum-scores make little sense. The most 
inclusive summary measure is still how long and happily people live.   
 
 
There are many words that are used to indicate how well we are doing. Some of these signify 
overall thriving; currently the terms 'quality of life' and 'wellbeing' are used for this purpose, and 
sometimes the word 'health' 1.  In the past the terms 'happiness' and 'welfare' were more 
commonly used.  There are several problems with these terms. 
 One problem is that these terms do not have an unequivocal meaning. Sometimes they 
are used as an umbrella for all that is good, but on other occasions they denote specific merit. For 
instance: the term 'wellbeing' is used to denote the quality of life-as-a-whole and to evaluate life-
aspects such as dwelling conditions or employment chances. Likewise, the phrase 'quality-of-life' 
refers in some contexts to the quality of society and in other instances to the happiness of its 
citizens. There is little view on a consensus on the meaning of these words; the trend is rather to 
divergence. Over time, connotations tend to become more specific and manifold. Discursive 
communities tend to develop their own quality-of-life notions.  
 The second problem is in the connotation of inclusiveness. The use of the words as an 
umbrella term suggests that there is something as 'overall' quality of life, and that specific merits 
can be meaningfully added in some wider worth; however that holistic assumption is dubious. 
Philosophers have never agreed on one final definition of quality-of-life, and in the practice of 
empirical quality-of-life measurement we see comparisons of apples and pears.  
 The above problem of many meanings is partly caused by the suggestion of 
inclusiveness. One of the reasons why the meanings become more specific is that the rhetoric of 
encompassingnes crumbles when put to practice. The broad overall meaning appears typically 
unfeasible in measurement and decision making. Hence connotations tend to become more 
specific and diverse. As result, rhetoric denotation of the overall good requires new terms 
periodically. New expressions pop up as against more narrow meanings. For instance, in the field 
of healthcare the term 'quality of life' emerged to convey the idea that there is more than mere 
quantity of survival time. Likewise, the word 'wellbeing' came into use in contrast to sheer 
economic 'welfare' 2. Yet, in the long run these new term fall victim to their success. Once they
  
Correspondence to: Prof. Dr. Ruut Veenhoven  Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
P.O.B. 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands.      www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven 
                                        
 
are adopted as a goal for policy, analysts and trend watchers start extracting palpable meanings 
and make the concepts ever more ‘multi-dimensional’. 
 
Obviously, this communicative practice causes much confusion and impedes the development of 
knowledge in this field. In reaction, there have been many proposals for standard definitions 3. 
Unfortunately, this has not really helped. Firstly, such scientific definitions hardly affect the 
common use of language. Secondly, they add to the confusion, because scholars are not able to 
agree on one meaning either, for instance, McCall 1975) defines quality-of-life as 'necessary 
conditions for happiness', while (Terhune 1973) defines it as subjective satisfaction itself. 
Likewise, Colby (1987) describes wellbeing as 'adaptive potential', whereas Jolles & Stalpers 
(1978: 31) define it as 'basic commend to life'. Elsewhere I have listed fifteen definitions of 
happiness (Veenhoven 1984:16-17). Recently Noll (1999) listed many meanings of quality of 
life in nations. 
 Since we cannot really force the use of words, we can better try to clarify their use. We 
can elucidate the matter by distinguishing different meanings. An analytic tool for this purpose is 
proposed in this article. First a fourfold classification of qualities of life is presented (§ 1). By 
means of this taxonomy common terms and distinctions are placed (§ 2). The matrix is then used 
to chart substantive meanings in common measures of the good life (§ 3). Next the question is 




1.         GROUPING QUALITIES OF LIFE 
 
Terms like 'quality of life', 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote evaluations. When sorting out what 
kind of evaluation they aim at, we must establish what thing is evaluated by what standard.  
 
 
1.1       Quality of what life? 
In the case of 'quality of life' the object of evaluation is 'life'. Mostly that life is an individual life, 
the quality of life of a person.  Yet the term is also used for aggregates, for instance when we 
speak about the quality-of-life of women. In that case the term refers usually to the average of 
individuals. Sometimes the term is used in reference to humanity as a whole. In this context the 
object of evaluation is mostly the average individual, and the long-term destiny of the species. 
The evaluation then concerns 'human life', rather than 'human lives'.  
 The term 'quality of life' does not refer exclusively to human life. It is also used for 
animals, for instance in discussions about conditions of slaughter cattle. At a higher level of 
abstraction it is also used for all life. Quality of life is then the condition of the entire ecosystem. 
Ecological propagandists like this confusion of object matter, because it suggests that protection 
of endangered species is also good for the individual human. 
 The terms 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote even more varied objects of evaluation, 
because they are also used in reference to social systems. When speaking about the 'public 
wellbeing' or the 'happiness of the nation' we often aim at the collective level, how well society 
functions and maintains itself. Propagandists also exploit this ambiguity, in this case as a means 
to disguise differences in interest between individuals and society. 
 
In this paper I focus on the quality of individual human lives. As we will see, that is difficult 
enough.  




1.2      What quality of life? 
The aim of this paper is to chart the specific meanings denoted by terms like quality-of-life, so 
we must explore what qualities are implied by the term quality. This requires an exploration of 
the "varieties of the good". 
 A classic distinction is between 'objective' and 'subjective' quality of life. The first refers 
to the degree a life meets explicit standards of the good life, as assessed by an impartial outsider. 
For instance the result of a medical examination.  The latter variant concerns self-appraisals 
based on implicit criteria, for example, someone's subjective feeling of health. These qualities do 
not necessarily correspond; someone may be in good health by the criteria of his doctor, but 
nevertheless feel bad. On the basis of this distinction, Zapf (1984: 25) has proposed a fourfold 
classification of 'welfare' concepts. When conditions of life score good on objective measures 
and subjective appreciation of life is positive he speaks of 'wellbeing', when both evaluations are 
negative he speaks of 'deprivation'. When objective quality is good, but subjective appreciation is 
negative, the term 'dissonance' is applied, and the combination of bad conditions and positive 
appreciation is labeled 'adaptation'. 
 Though elegant, these distinctions have not proven particularly useful. The taxonomy 
does not explain much. The main reason is that the difference is more in observation than in 
substance. Objective health-assessment aims at the same qualities as subjective appraisals, 
though by different means. Further the labeling gives rise to misunderstanding. The word 
'objective' suggest indisputable truth, whereas the term 'subjective' is easily interpreted as a 
matter of arbitrary taste. This suggestion is false, the fact that income can be measured 
objectively does not mean that its value is beyond question.  
     
Chances and outcomes 
A substantively more relevant distinction is between opportunities for a good life and the good 
life itself. This is the difference between potentiality and actuality. I refer to this as 'life-chances'4 
and 'life-results'.  Opportunities and outcomes are related, but are certainly not the same. Chances 
can fail to be realized, due to stupidity or bad luck. Conversely, people sometimes make much of 
their life in spite of poor opportunities. 
 This distinction is quite common in the field of public-health research. Pre-conditions for 
good health, such as adequate nutrition and professional care are seldom mixed up with health 
itself. Much research is aimed at assessing the relationships between these phenomena; for 
instance by checking whether common nutritional advice really yields extra years lived in good 
health.  
 Yet in social policy discussions means and ends are less well distinguished. For instance, 
in the Netherlands the term 'wellbeing' is used for both social services, i.e. state pensions, as well 
as for the expected effects, satisfied citizens. This is not just sloppy thinking, it is also an 
expression of the ideology that there is quality to be found in the welfare society.  
 
Outer and inner qualities  
A second difference is between 'external' and 'internal' qualities. In the first case the quality is in 
the environment, in the latter it is in the individual. Lane (1994) made this distinction clear by 
emphasizing 'quality of persons'. Likewise Musschenga (1994: 182) discerned 'quality of 
conditions for living'from 'the quality of being human'. 
 This distinction is also quite commonly made in public health. External pathogens are 
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distinguished from inner afflictions, and researchers try to identify the mechanisms by which the 
former produce the latter and the conditions in which this is more and less likely. Yet again this 
basic insight is lacking in many social policy discussions. For instance, in the current discourse 
on city renewal the word 'quality-of-life' is used both for clean streets and feelings of being home 
in the neighborhood. All the research that found negligible relationships has not changed this use 
of words.  
 
 
   
1.3.       Four qualities of life 
The combination of these two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. This classification is 
presented in scheme 1. The distinction between chances and results is presented vertically, the 
difference between outer and inner qualities horizontally. 
 
 
Scheme 1  






































1.3.1    Two kinds of life chances 
In the upper half of the scheme we see two variants of potential quality of life, with next to the 
outer opportunities in one's environment, the inner capacities to exploit these. The environmental 
chances can be denoted by the term livability, the personal capacities with the word life-ability. 
This difference is not new. In sociology the distinction between 'social capital' and 'psychological 
capital' is sometimes used in this context. In the psychology of stress the difference is labeled 
negatively in terms of 'burden' and 'bearing power'.  
 
Livability of the environment   
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions. Often the terms 'quality-of-
life' and 'wellbeing' are used in this particular meaning, especially in the writings of ecologists 
and sociologists. Economists sometimes use the term 'welfare' for this meaning. Another term is 
'level of living' 
 'Livability' is a better word, because it refers explicitly to a characteristic of the 
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environment and does not have the limited connotation of material conditions. One could also 
speak of the 'habitability' of an environment, though that term is also used for the quality of 
housing in particular. Elsewhere I have explored that concept of livability in more detail 
(Veenhoven 1996:7-9).   
 
Life-ability of the person  
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped to cope 
with the problems of life. This aspect of the good life is also known by different names. The 
words 'quality of life' and 'wellbeing' are also used to denote this specific meaning, especially by 
doctors and psychologists. There are more names however. In biology the phenomenon is 
referred to as 'adaptive potential'. On other occasions it is denoted by the medical term 'health', in 
the medium variant of the word 5, or by psychological terms such as 'efficacy' or 'potency'. Sen 
(1992) calls this quality of life variant 'capability'. I prefer the simple term 'life-ability', which 
contrasts elegantly with 'livability'. 
 
1.3.2  Two kinds of life-results 
The lower half of the scheme is about the quality of life with respect to its outcomes. These 
outcomes can be judged by their value for one's environment and value for oneself.  The external 
worth of a life is denoted by the term 'utility of life'. The inner valuation of it is called 
'appreciation of life'. These matters are of course related. Knowing that one’s life is useful will 
typically add to the appreciation of it.  Yet not all useful lives are happy lives and not every 
good-for-nothing really cares.  This difference has been elaborated in discussions on utilitaristic 
moral philosophy, which praises happiness as the highest good. Adversaries of that view hold 
that there is more worth to life than just pleasures and pains. Mill (1863) summarized that 
position in his famous statement that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool. 
 
Utility of life   
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for something more 
than itself. This presumes some higher values. There is no current generic for these external 
turnouts of life. Gerson (1976: 795) referred to these kinds as 'transcendental' conceptions of 
quality of life. Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' significance 
instead of mere subjective sense of meaning.  I prefer the more simple 'utility of life', admitting 
that this label may also give rise to misunderstanding6. Be aware that this external utility does not 
require inner awareness. A person's life may be useful from some viewpoint, without them 
knowing7.  
 
Appreciation of life   
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the quality in the 
eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans this quality boils down to subjective 
appreciation of life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-
satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of the word8. Life has more of this quality, the 
more and the longer it is enjoyed. In fairy tales this combination of intensity and duration is 
denoted with the phrase 'they lived long and happily'. 
 
   
1.4       Similar distinctions in other disciplines 
This categorizing can be clarified using some analogies. Similar conceptual distinctions can 
be found in biology, economics and systems theory. 





In evolutionary biology, external living conditions are referred to as the 'biotope' or 'habitat'. A 
biotope can be more or less suitable (livable) for a species, depending on e.g. availability of food, 
shelter and competition. Inner capabilities to survive in that environment are called 'fitness'. This 
latter term acknowledges that capabilities must meet (fit) environmental demand. Unlike moral 
philosophers, biologists see no quality in capacity that is not functional. 
 This chance-constellation is seen to result in 'adaptation', and good adaptation is seen to 
manifest in ‘survival’.  As evolutionary biologists focus on species rather than on individual 
specimen, they mean mostly survival of the species. Hence the success of an individual life is 
mainly judged by its procreation. Once genes have been passed on, the external utility of an 
individual life is often little more than that of a prey for another creature. 
 At the individual level good adaptation is seen to manifest in a relatively long life. An 
organism that perishes prematurely has adapted less well than the one that completed its 
programmed lifetime. In higher animals, good adaptation also reflects in hedonic experience. 
Continuous stress and pain is indicative of poor adaptation. As humans are capable of reflecting 
on their experiences, their feelings of pleasure and pain condense into overall appraisals of 
happiness. So, human adaptation manifests in long and happy living. Though inner experience is 
no great issue in biology, this idea is implied in its logic. These biological concepts are 
summarized in scheme 2a. 
 
Scheme 2a 
Comparable concepts in biology 







































In economic thought, the equivalent of the life situation for a person is the market for a business. 
As a person's situation can be more or less livable, so a market can be more or less exploitable. 
Successful exploitation of market chances requires 'capital', both financial capital to buy 
materials and machinery and human capital to run the enterprise.  Capital is, for a business, what 
'capability' is for an individual. These chances can result in economic success. At the business 
level this is 'profit', which is analogous to an individual's 'appreciation of life' 9. At the societal 
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level business success can contribute to public wealth, and thereby to social and cultural 










































Finally there is also an analogy with system theory, the main concepts of which are 'input', 
'throughput' and 'output'. In this thinking, 'input' is the system's environment, in particular the 
things the system can extract from that environment. Without any input, the system cannot 
function and perishes. The richer the input is, the better, and the more in line it is with the 
systems needs. Good input for a system is what a 'livable' situation is for an individual.  
 System theory acknowledges that environmental supply alone is not enough to keep the 
system going. The system must actively process the input. This is commonly called 'throughput'. 
The capacity to do this job is an inner quality of the system. This system capability is analogous 
to ‘life-ability’ of a person.  
 In system theory the term 'output' denotes all results of system activity. Part of that output 
is external and serves as input for other systems. This is analogous to the 'utility of life'. Another 
part of the output is used for system preservation. This concerns inner effects and belongs to the 
right bottom quadrant. 
 For an individual, system maintenance involves first of all survival. Since biological 
organisms cannot live forever, that boils down to living a relatively long life. In higher 
organisms, system-preservation systems also manifests in how well they feel. As noted above, 
affective appraisals function as feedback mechanisms in higher animals, positive affect typically 
signaling that things are going well. In humans these appraisals are condensed into estimates of 
overall 'happiness'. So, in humans, good output manifests at the individual level in long and 
happy living. 
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2.        ORDERING CONCEPTS OF THE GOOD LIFE 
 
With the help of this matrix we can now place the various notions about the good life. I will start 
with an overview of concepts that neatly fit the quality quadrants (§ 2.1). Next I will mention 
some common notions that overlap quadrants (§ 2.2). Finally I confront the matrix with some 
other classifications of qualities of life  (§ 2.3) 
  
 
2.1      Meanings within quality-quadrants  
Most discussions of the good life deal with more specific values than the four qualities of life 
discerned here. Within each is the quadrants there is a myriad of sub-meanings, most of which 
are known under different names. It would need a voluminous book to record all the terms and 
meanings used in the literature. I present some of the main variants below. The main points are 
summarized in scheme 3.  
 
2.1.1  Aspects of livability 
Livability is an umbrella term for the various qualities of the environment, which seem relevant 
for meeting human needs. In rhetoric use the word refers mostly to specific kinds of qualities 
which typically root in some broader perception of the good society. The circumstantial qualities 
that are emphasized differ widely across contexts and disciplines. 
 Ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in terms of pollution, 
global warming and degradation of nature. Currently, they associate livability typically with 
'preservation'. City planners see livability in the built environment and associate it with sewer 
systems, traffic jams and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a fruit of human 
intervention.  
 In the sociological view society is central. Firstly, livability is associated with the quality 
Scheme 2c 
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of society as a whole. Classic concepts of the ‘good society’ stress material welfare and social 
equality, sometimes equating the concept more or less with the welfare state. Current notions 
emphasize close networks, strong norms and active voluntary associations. The reverse of that 
livability concept is ‘social fragmentation’. Secondly, livability is seen in one’s position in 
society. For long the emphasis was on ‘under-class’ but currently attentions shifts to ‘outer-
class’. The corresponding antonyms are ‘deprivation’ and ‘exclusion’. 
   
2.1.2 Kinds of life-ability 
The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of functional defects. This is 'health' 
in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as 'negative health'. In this context doctors focus on 
unimpaired functioning of the body while psychologists stress the absence of mental defects. In 
their language, quality of life and wellbeing are often synonymous with mental health. This use 
of words presupposes a 'normal' level of functioning. Good quality of life is the body or mind 
working as designed. This is the common meaning used in curative care. 
 Next to absence of disease one can consider excellence of function. This is referred to as 
'positive health' and associated with energy and resilience. Psychological concepts of positive 
mental health involve also autonomy, reality control, creativity and inner synergy of traits and 
strivings. A new term in this context is 'emotional intelligence'. Though originally meant for 
specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a broad range of mental capabilities.  This 
broader definition is the favorite in the training professions. 
 A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to include 
acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term 'self-actualization', 
from this point of view a middle-aged man is not 'well' if he behaves like an adolescent, even if 
he functions with problems at this level. This quality concept is also currently used in the training 
professions. 
 Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts this quality is 
distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art 
of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life and an original style of life. 
   
2.1.3 Criteria for utility of life  
When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its functionality for the 
environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential a patient's life is to its intimates. The 
life of a mother with young children is valued as higher than the life of a woman of the same age 
without children. Likewise, indispensability at the workplace figures in medical quality of life 
notions.  
 At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. Historians see quality 
in the addition an individual can make to human culture, and rate for example the lives of great 
inventors higher than those of anonymous peasants. Moralists see quality in the preservation of 
the moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner.   
 In this vein the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the ecosystem. Ecologists see 
more quality in a life lived in a 'sustainable' manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader 
view, the utility of life can be seen in its consequences for long term evolution. As an individual's 
life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost infinite.  
 
Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. Returning to 
Mill's statement that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool. Mill did not say this just 
because Socrates was a philosopher whose words have come down to us; it was also because he 
admired Socrates as an outstanding human being. Likewise, most of us would attribute more 
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quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that of a drunk, even if it appeared that her 
good works had a negative result in the end. In classic moral philosophy this is called 'virtuous 
living', and is often presented as the essence of 'true happiness'.  
 This concept of exemplaric utility sometimes merges with notions of inner life-ability, in 
particular in the case of self-actualization. Self-development is deemed good, even if it might 
complicate life. In some philosophies of life, reaching a state of enlightenment is more important 
than departing from it.  
 This quality criterion is external; the individuals need not be aware of their perfection or 
may actually despise it. It is an outsider that appraises the quality of the individual's life on the 
basis of an external criterion. In religious thinking such a judgement is made by God on the basis 
of eternal truth, in post-modern thought it narrated by self-proclaimed experts on the basis of 
local conviction.  
 
Clearly, the utility of life is not easy to grasp the criteria and those who would judge, are 
multifarious. Later we will see that this prohibits comprehensive measurement of this quality of 
life. This quadrant is typically the playground of philosophers.  
 
 
2.1.4  Appreciation of life 
Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. As already noted, we have in 
common with all higher animals that we can appraise our situation affectively. We feel good 
or bad about particular things and our mood level signals overall adaptation. As in animals 
these affective appraisals are automatic, but unlike other animals it is known that humans can 
reflect on that experience. We have an idea of how we have felt over the last year, while a cat 
does not. Humans can also judge life cognitively by comparing life as it is with notions of 
how it should be. 
Most human evaluations are based on both sources of information, that is: intuitive 
affective appraisal and cognitively guided evaluation. The mix depends mainly on the object. 
Tangible things such as our income are typically evaluated by comparison; intangible matters 
such as sexual attractiveness are evaluated by how it feels. This dual evaluation system 
probably makes the human experiential repertoire richer than that of our fellow-creatures.  
In evaluating our life we typically summarize this rich experience in overall 
appraisals. For instance we appreciate several domains of life. When asked how we feel 
about our work or own marriage we will mostly have an opinion. Likewise, most people form 
ideas about separate qualities of their life, for instance how challenging their life is and 
whether there is any meaning in it. Such judgments are made in different time-perspectives, 
in the past, the present and in the future. As the future is less palpable than the past and the 
present, hopes and fears depend more on affective inclination than on cognitive calculation.  
Mostly such judgments are not very salient in our consciousness. Now and then they 
pop to mind spontaneously, and they can be recalled and refreshed when needed.  Sometimes 
however, life-appraisals develop into pervasive mental syndromes such as depression or 
ennui.  
 
Next to aspects of life we also evaluate life-as-a-whole. Jeremy Bentham  (1789) thought of 
this form of evaluation as a type of ‘mental calculus’, and currently most scholars in the field 
also see it as a cognitive operation. For instance Andrews & Withey (1976) suggest that 
individuals compute a weighed average of earlier life-aspect evaluations, while Michalos’ 
(1985) multiple discrepancy theory presumes comparisons of life as it is with various 
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standards of how it should be. Many philosophers see it as an estimate of success in realizing 
one’s life-plan (f.e. Nordenfelt 1989).  
Yet there are good reasons to assume that overall life-satisfaction is mostly inferred 
from affective experience (Veenhoven 1997: 59-61). One reason is that life-as-a-whole is not 
a suitable object for calculative evaluation. Life has many aspects and there is usually not one 
clear-cut ideal model to compare with. Another reason seems to be that affective signals tend 
to dominate, seemingly cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues (Zajonc 
1980). This fits the theory that the affective system is the older in evolutionary terms, and 
that cognition works as an addition to that navigation system rather than a replacement.  
This issue has important consequences for the significance of subjective appreciation 
of life as a criterion for quality-of-life. If appreciation is a matter of mere comparison with 
arbitrary standards, there is little of value in a positive evaluation; dissatisfaction is then an 
indication of high demands. If, however, happiness signals the degree to which innate needs 
are met, life-satisfaction denotes how well we thrive. 
Whatever the method of assessment, the fact that we are able to come to an overall 
evaluation of life is quite important. Later on we will see that this is the only basis for 
encompassing judgments of the quality of life. 
  
Scheme 3
















Livability of environment 
· Ecological 
e.g. moderate climate, clean air, spacious 
housing, 
· Social 
e.g.. freedom, equality and brotherhood 
· Economical 
e.g. wealthy nation,  generous social 
security, smooth economic development 
· Cultural 





Life-ability of the person 
· Physical health 
negative: free of disease 
positive: energetic, resilient 
• Mental health 
negative: free of mental defects 
positive: autonomous, creative 
• Knowledge 
e.g.  literacy, schooling 
• Skills 
e.g. intelligence, manners 
• Art of living 
e.g. varied lifestyle, differentiated taste 








Objective utility of life 
· External utility 
e.g.  For intimates: rearing children, care 
for friends  
e.g.  For society: being a good citizen 
e.g.  for mankind: leaving an invention   
· Moral perfection 




Subjective appreciation of life  
· appraisal of life-aspects 
e.g. Satisfaction with job 
e.g. satisfaction with variety 
· Prevailing moods 
e.g. Depression, ennui 
e.g. zest 
· Overall appraisals 
Affective: general mood-level 
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2.2    Meanings in broader words for the good life  
With the help of the taxonomy given above, we can now clarify the substantive meaning of 
several further terms. This enumeration is not exhaustive; the goal is to illustrate this approach  
 




This term came into use in the 1960's, in particular in gerontologic studies of 'adjustment to old 
age', and was used interchangeably with ‘adaptation. These words were soon ousted by phrases 
like 'morale', 'psychological wellbeing' and 'life-satisfaction'. The term referred to personal 
qualities; hence it belongs in the right side of our matrix. Adjustment denotes how well a person 
deals with life, and refers both to equipment and success. Hence the concept does not fit one 
quadrant, but covers both life-abilities and life-appraisals. In the diagram this is indicated by two 
equally dark quadrants. 
 
  




The expression 'art of living' refers, first of all, to a person's life-ability and therefore belongs in 
the right-top quadrant. As noted above, the term depicts mostly the quality of a life-style, 
typically refined Epicurianism, but sometimes the wisdom of simple living is also valued as 
artistry. This main meaning is reflected in the dark colored quadrant. Yet the term bears other 
connotations, capacity is often associated with its intended results, hence art of living tends to be 
equated with happiness, or at least with sensorial gratification. Further, the life of a life-artist is 
sometimes valued as a piece of art in itself, which has some external utility. For instance, we see 
quality in the life of Casanova, even though the man himself seems not to have been particularly 
happy. The adjunct connotations of the word are indicated in gray. 
 
Deprivation           
  
  
The word 'deprivation' refers to shortfall of something. When used in an absolute sense it means 
failure to meet basic human needs, when used in a relative sense it means being less well off than 
others. The word is typically used in the latter meaning, while suggesting the former. Current 
specifications of this notion are 'poverty' and 'social exclusion'.  
 In most contexts the lack is in external conditions of life, and concerns access to income, 
power and prestige. In social policy this kind of deprivation is typically met with redistribution of 
these scarce resources. This main meaning belongs in the livability quadrant. 
 Sometimes the word also refers to deficiency in ones capacity to stand up for oneself. 
The political cure for this problem is 'empowerment', common ingredients of which are general 
education, political training and boosting of self-esteem. The latter adjunct definition belongs in 
the life-ability quadrant. 
 Usually these conditions are associated with the expected outcome for individuals, that is 
with 'happiness'. Hence measures of deprivation often include items on dissatisfaction, 
depression and suicidal ideation. Enjoyment of life in spite of objective deprivation is seen as an 
anomaly. As we have seen above, in Zapf's conceptual schema it is labeled 'resignation' 
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I will now continue the earlier discussion on the connotations of the word happiness. As noted in 
the introduction of this paper, the word has often been used as a generic for all worth and is in 
this sense synonymous with comprehensive 'quality-of-life' or 'wellbeing'. In the later discussion 
of inner outcome notions, the word came back in two, more narrow forms, first as a label for all 
subjective appraisals of life, and second, as the overall evaluation of life as a whole. The latter 
use of the word is most common in present day 'social indicators research'. 
Beyond this main denotation of the word, there are still further adjunctive uses of the term. This 
appears for example in the well known definition of happiness given by Tatarkiewicz (1975:16)  
"…..justified satisfaction with life".  The adjective 'justified' means that mere enjoyment of life 
does not constitute (true) happiness if it occurs in abjective situations, for example a prisoner 
cannot be really happy. Similarly Tatarkiewicz would not call someone happy when the 
evaluation is based on misperception, such as in the case of the simpleton ‘happy Hans’, or when 
the enjoyment is derived from a useless life. 
 
2.3     Difference with other classifications of qualities of life  
This is of course not the first attempt to chart concepts of the good life. A few examples will 
show how this matrix differs from other taxonomies. 
 Philosopher Dan Brock (1993: 268-275) also tried to grasp ".the broadest conception of .. 
what makes a life go best". He distinguishes three main concepts: 1) the degree to which life fits 
current values and ideals, 2) the degree to which life fits the individuals preferences, and 3) the 
degree to which the individual enjoys life subjectively. He denotes the first concept as ‘objective’ 
and the other two as ‘subjective’. Brock insists on the difference between satisfaction of 
preferences (contentment in my terminology) and hedonic enjoyment (mood level). 
 These meanings are plotted in scheme 3a. The difference is not so much in the 
appreciation quadrant, but in the other three. Brock’s classification is less differentiated, and 
shovels all the objective meanings into one heap. As he is mainly concerned with health care, 
one can imagine that he leaves out societal livability. Yet he does not distinguish either between 
'capability for life’ and ‘utility of life’, though this distinction is quite relevant for medical 
decisions. 
 Sandoe  (1999) proposes a similar classification, which also separates realization of 
preferences and hedonic experience. The difference is that his ‘objective’ qualities limit to the 
development of potentials. His refers to that quality as ‘Perfectionism’. This is what I referred to 
as ‘self-actualization’. In the matrix it is a part of the life-ability quadrant. 
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Scheme 3a 






























life meets preferences 
life is enjoyed 
 
 
Storrs McCall (1975) also distinguishes two main concepts of quality of life. Next to happiness 
itself he emphasizes conditions for happiness. In his view life has also quality if the necessary 
social conditions are available, even if an individual fails to exploit these chances or opts not to 
use them. Happiness is seen to result from need-gratification, and hence the necessary conditions 
are linked to basic human needs. In this concept human nature is the mayor yardstick, and not 
normative ideals. Consequently, the utility quadrant remains empty in this case. McCall does not 
distinguish between external and internal requisites, thus the two top quadrants are merged. 
     
Scheme 3b 

















   
 
   Conditions for happiness 
• General happiness requisites 
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3.      ORDERING MEASURES OF THE GOOD LIFE 
 
The last decades have witnessed a surge in empirical research on the good life, in particular 
in the fields of social indicators research and medical quality of life assessment. This has 
produced a wealth of measures. Testbanks contain hundreds of them. See for instance 
Cummins (1994), Spilker (1996) and Veenhoven (2000a). 
 Most of these measures are 'multi-dimensional' and are used to assess different 
qualities of life. Typically, the scores on the different qualities are presented separately in a 
'quality-of-life profile'. Often they are also summed in a 'quality-of-life score'. Next, there are 
also 'uni-dimensional' measures, which focus on one specific quality. Such single qualities 
are often measured by single questions. For instance, the condition of cancer patients is also 
measured by simply asking them where they stand between the best and worst they have ever 
experienced (Bernheim & Buyse 1983). 
 A lively discussion about the pros and cons of these measures is still going on. This 
discussion is dominated by psychometricians, who focus very much on factor loadings, 
reliability issues and inter-test correlations. There is less attention for matters of substance, so 
there is no clear answer to the question of what these measures actually measure. One of the 
reasons for this deficiency is a lack of a clear taxonomy of the qualities of life.  
 Now we have a classification of meanings we can give it another try. Below I will 
first outline which of these qualities figure in measures that claim to cover the good of life 
inclusively (§ 3.1).  Next I will explore whether there are measures that fit one of the four 
qualities of life separately (§ 3.2).  
 
  
3.1     Meanings in comprehensive measures of quality of life 
As there are so many measures of the good life, I cannot review them all. Four examples 
must suffice to illustrate the approach. The examples are taken from different research fields: 
a) medical ‘quality of life’ research, b) psychological ‘wellbeing’ research, c) sociologically 
oriented research on ‘welfare’ and d) socio-economic studies of national ‘development’.  
 
3.1.1 Example of a medical quality of life index 
One of the most common measures in medical quality of life research is the 'SF-36 Health 
Survey' (Ware 1996). It is a questionnaire on the following topics: 
• physical limitations in daily chores (10 items) 
• physical limitations to work performance (4 items) 
• bodily pain (2 items) 
• perceived general health (6 items) 
• vitality (4 items) 
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• physical and/or emotional limitations to social functioning (2 items) 
• emotional limitations to work performance (3 items) 
• self characterizations as nervous (1item) 
• recent enjoyment of life (4 items) 
Ratings on the first four topics are grouped in a 'Physical Component Subscore', ratings on 
the last four topics in a 'Mental Component Subscore'. These components are added into a  
'Quality of life Total score'. 
 
Most elements of this scale refer to performance potential and belong in the life-ability 
quadrant right top. This will be no surprise, since the scale is aimed explicitly at health. Still, 
some of the items concern outcomes rather than potency, in particular the items on recent 
enjoyment of life (last on the list). Pain and bad feelings are typically the result of health 
defects. Happiness is clearly also an outcome. As a proper health measure, the SF-36 does 
not involve outer qualities. So the left quadrants in scheme 4a remain empty.  
Several other medical measures of quality of life do involve items about 
environmental conditions that belong in the livability quadrant. For instance, the 'Quality Of 
Life Interview Schedule' by Ouelette-Kuntz (1990) is about availability of services for 
handicapped persons. In this supply centered measure of the good life, life is better the more 
services are offered and the more greedily they are used. Likewise, the Quality of Life Index 
for cancer patients (Spitzer et al 1981) lists support by family and friends as a quality 
criterion. Some medical indexes also include outer effects that belong to the utility quadrant. 









































3.1.2  Example of a psychological wellbeing scale 
Cummins (1993) sees quality of life (QOL) as an aggregate of 'objective' and 'subjective' 
components. Each of these components is divided into the following seven domains: 
• material wellbeing: measured by income, quality of house and possessions. 
• health: measured by number of disabilities and medical consumption. 
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• productivity: measured by activities in work, education and leisure 
• intimacy: contacts with close friends,  availability of support  
• safety: perceived safety of home, quality of sleep, worrying 
• place in community: social activities, responsibilities, being asked for advise 
• emotional wellbeing: opportunity to do/have things wanted, enjoyment of life 
Overall QOL is measured using a points system, objective QOL using simple scores, 
subjective QOL using satisfaction with domains weighted by perceived importance of 
domains. Finally the scores on objective and subjective QOL are added.  
 
The objective scores of this list represent typically life-chances, though the safety items are 
subjective appraisals. This item is therefore placed between brackets in scheme 4b. Most of 
the items concern environmental chances and are placed in the livability quadrant left top. 
Two items concern inner capabilities and are placed in the life-ability quadrant top right. 
 The subjective scores all refer to how the individual appreciates these aspects of life, 
and belong in the enjoyment quadrant bottom right. The Cummins scale has no items on 
overall satisfaction with life. The logic of his system produces the somewhat peculiar item 
'How satisfied are you with your own happiness?' (item 7 SQOL). 
 The bottom left quadrant remains empty in this interpretation; however, some of the 
life-chance items can also be seen as indicative of outer results. The measures of  'place in 
community' imply not only better access to scarce resources, but can also denote contribution 
to society. Likewise, the productivity item may not only tap ability to work, but also the 
results of it. For this reason these items are placed in brackets in the meaning quadrant.  
 
Scheme 4b 
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 Scandinavia ‘Study of comparative welfare’ under the direction of Erik Allardt (1976). Welfare 
was measured using the following criteria: 
• income 
• housing 
• political support 
• social relations 
• irreplaceable 





Allardt classified these indicators using his, now classic distinction, between 'having', 'loving’ 
and 'being'. This labeling was appealing at that time, because it expressed the rising conviction 
that welfare is more than just material wealth, and because it fitted modish notions drawn from 
humanistic psychology.  Though it is well known, the classification has not proven to be very 
useful. 
     These indicators can also be ordered in the fourfold matrix proposed here. See scheme 4c. 
Most of the items belong in the left-top quadrant because they concern pre-conditions for a 
good life rather than good living as such, and because these chances are in the environment 
rather than in the individual. This is the case with income, housing, political support and social 
relations. Two further items also denote chances but these are internal capabilities. This is the 
health factor and level of education. These items are placed in the top-right quadrant of personal 
life-ability. The item 'irreplaceable' belongs in the utility bottom left quadrant. It denotes a value 
of life to others. The last two items belong in the enjoyment bottom right quadrant. 'Doing 
interesting things' denotes appreciation of an aspect of life10, while life-satisfaction concerns 
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3.1.3  Example of a sociological measure of individual quality of life  
One of the first attempts to chart quality of life in a general population was the made in the 
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Lastly an illustration using measures used in cross-national comparisons of quality of life. The 
most commonly used indicator in this field is the 'Human Development Index'. This index was 
developed for the United Nations Development Program which describes the progress in all 
countries of the world in its annual 'Human Development Reports' (UNDP 1990). The Human 
Development Index is the mayor yardstick used in these reports. The basic variant of this 
measure involves three items; note that we deal now with scores drawn from national statistical 
aggregates instead of individual responses to questionnaires: 
• public wealth, measured by buying power per head. 
• education, as measured by literacy and schooling. 
• life-expectancy at birth 
Later variants of the HDI involve further items 
• gender-equality measured by the so-called 'Gender empowerment index’ which involves 
male-female ratios in literacy, school enrolment and income. 
• poverty measured by prevalence of premature death, functional illiteracy and poverty  
In a theoretical account of this measure the UNDP says to focus on how development enlarges 
people's choice, and there by their chances for leading long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP 
1990: 9).  
 
When placed in our fourfold matrix, this index can be seen to have three meanings. Firstly, it is 
about living conditions, in the basic variant of material affluence in society, and in the variant of 
social equality. These items belong in the top left quadrant. In the case of wealth it is 
acknowledged that this environmental merit is subject to diminishing utility, however this is not 
so with the equalities. Secondly, the HDI includes abilities. The education item belongs in the 
top right quadrant. Though a high level of education does not guarantee high mental health and 
pronounced ability in the art of living, it means that many citizens at least have basic knowledge. 
Lastly, the item 'life-expectancy' is an outcome variable and belongs in the bottom right 
quadrant. The bottom left quadrant remains empty. The UNDP's measure of development does 
not involve specific notions about the meaning of life. 
 The HDI is the most concise measure of quality of life in nations. Extended variants in 
this family provide more illustration; for instance, Naroll's  (1984: 73) 'Quality of Life Index' 
includes contributions to science by the country, which fits the utility quadrant. The index also 
includes suicide rates, which belong to the appreciation quadrant. 
 
Scheme 4d 


































3.1.4 Example of a measure of quality of life in nations 







3.2       Measures for specific qualities of life 
Next to these encompassing measures of quality of life there are measures that denote 
specific qualities. These indicators can also be mapped on the matrix. Again some illustrative 
examples will suffice. 
 
3.2.1   Measures of livability 
Environmental life-chances are measured in two ways, by the possibilities embodied in the 
environment as a whole, and by relative access to these opportunities. The former measures 
concern the livability of societies, such as nations or cities. These indicators are typically 
used in developmental policy. The latter are about relative advantage or deprivation of 
persons in these contexts, and are rooted mostly in the politics of redistribution. These chance 
estimates are seldom combined. 
 
Contents  Measures of livability of society concern first nations; an illustrative example is 
Estes' (1984) 'Index of Social Progress'. This measure involves aspects such as wealth of the 
nation, peace with neighbors, internal stability and democracy. The physical habitability of 
the land is also acknowledged. There are similar measures for quality of life in cities (e.g. 
Kunz & Siefer 1995) and regions (e.g. Korczak 1995). There are also livability counts for 
more or less ‘total’ institutions such as army bases, prisons, mental hospitals and geriatric 
residences.  
Measures of relative deprivation focus on differences among citizens for such things 
as income, work and social contacts. Differences in command of these resources are typically 
interpreted as differential access to scarce resources (e.g. Townsend 1979).  
All these measures work with points systems and summate scores based on different 
criteria in some way. A part of the measures is based on objective assessments and is 
typically derived from social statistics. Others also include self-reports about living 
conditions and depend for this purpose on survey data.  
 
Limitations These inventories cannot really measure livability comprehensively. Firstly the 
two kinds are seldom combined; secondly both labor under serious limitations.  
Limitation number one is that the topics in these inventories do not exhaustively 
cover environmental conditions. The indexes consist of some tens of topics that are deemed 
relevant and happen to be measurable. The inventories obviously lack sections on conditions 
we do not know of as yet. Note for example, that the list of environmental pathogens is 
growing each year. Further, not all the conditions we are aware of are measurable. For 
instance, there are no measures for highly valued qualities like 'social solidarity' and 'cultural 
variety'. 
 Problem number two is the significance of topics that are included. Since there is no 
complete understanding of what we really need, we can only guess at the importance of a 
topic. Though it is evident that we need food and shelter, it is questionable whether we need 
holidays and a welfare state. The choice of topics to include in a livability index is not based 
on evidence that we cannot thrive without something, but on the researcher's preconceptions 
of the good life. Elsewhere I have proposed gauging the significance of livability topics by 
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their effects on health and happiness (Veenhoven 1996). The case of the welfare state can be 
used to illustrate that point. Several livability inventories include expenditures on social 
security, e.g. Naroll's (1984:73) 'Quality of Life Index'. Yet people appear not to thrive any 
better in nations with high social security expenditures than in comparable nations where 
state social security is modest (Veenhoven 2000b). Freedom appears to add more to 
happiness, in particular economic freedom (Veenhoven 2000c). 
Problem number three is the degree of opportunities required, how many should an 
environment provide to be livable? With respect to food and temperature we know fairly well 
what amounts we need minimally and what we can use maximally. Yet, on matters of safety, 
schooling, freedom and wealth we know little about minimum and possible maximum needs. 
Lacking this knowledge, most indexes assume that more is better. 
Problem number four is that the significance of opportunities is not the same for 
everybody, but depends on capabilities. For instance, freedom in nations appears to add to 
happiness only when people are well educated (Veenhoven 2000c). This means that topics 
should be given weights according to conditions. In practice that is hardly feasible. 
Lastly there is the problem of aggregation. The aim is inclusion of all relevant 
opportunities, but the practice is a summing of a few topics. The assortment of topics differs 
considerably across inventories, and it is not clear whether one collection is better than 
another is. In fact each ideology of the good life can compose its own livability index. 
Together this means that inclusive assessment of livability is not feasible. The best we 
can do is to make promising condition-profiles. Livability sum-scores make little sense.  
 
 
3.2.2  Measures of life-ability 
Capabilities for living are also measured in different ways. First there is a rich tradition of 
health measurement, which roots the healing professions. Second there is a trade in skill 
measurement, which serves selection within education and at work. Thirdly, capacities are 
also measured by performance at school and work.  
 
Contents Measures of health are, for the greater part, measures of negative health. There are 
various inventories of afflictions and functional limitations, several of which combine 
physical and mental impairments. Assessments are based on functional tests, expert ratings 
and self-reports. The above mentioned SF-36 is an example of the latter kind of measure. In 
the self-report tradition general health is also measured by single questions. For an overview 
of these health measures see Spilker (1996).  Next there are also some inventories for positive 
health, mainly self-report questionnaires in the tradition of personality assessment. Jahoda 
(1958) made the first selection of healthy traits. Verba (1988) reports a later attempt.  
Measures of skillfulness concern mostly mental abilities, many of which are parts of 
so called 'intelligence tests'.  Performance tests can be considered to be ‘objective’ 
assessment. A new offspring of this tradition is testing for 'emotional intelligence' (Mayor & 
Salovy 1993)11, which is mostly a matter of ‘subjective’ self-reporting. Next there are 
numerous tests for proficiency at work and in leisure, such as laying bricks or playing cards. 
Lastly, many abilities manifest in real life success. School success is measured in 
years schooling and by the level of schooling achieved. People who do badly at school or 
received no formal education in all probability lack several necessary abilities. In developing 
nations literacy is a common topic. Life-ability is also inferred from apparent success at work 
and in love. 
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Limitations  As in the case of livability, these measures do not provide a complete estimate of 
life-ability. Again the measures are seldom combined, and we meet the same fundamental 
limitations. 
Firstly, we cannot grasp all human capabilities; there are limitations to what we can 
conceive and what we can measure. Possibly the current measurement repertoire misses some 
essential talents, in particular aptitudes required for new challenges. 
Secondly, we are again uncertain about the significance of topics in the inventories. 
Possibly some of the things we learn in school are irrelevant. Valued positive mental health 
traits may actually be detrimental for coping with the problems of life. Unlike the case of 
livability, there is some significance testing in this field. Intelligence tests in particular are 
gauged by their predictive value for success at school and at work. Yet this validation 
criterion is not the most appropriate in this context, because success at school and work does 
not guarantee a happy life. Many of the other ability-tests available lack any validation.  
Thirdly, it is typically unclear how much of the ability is optimal, more is not always 
better.  As there are limitations to skill acquisition, it is the right mix that counts. 
Fourthly, the functionality of abilities is contingent to the situation and fit with other 
traits. For instance, assertiveness is more functional in an individualistic society than in a 
collectivist culture, and fits better with trait-autonomy than with trait-dependence.  
Lastly, we cannot adequately estimate general ability by adding up test-scores. 
Though psychometrists dream about a general ability factor, this seems to be a statistical epi-
phenomenon rather than a reality. So, also in this case we better limit to quality profiles.     
 
3.2.3  Measures for utility of life 
There are many criteria for evaluating the usefulness of a life, of which only a few can be 
quantified. When evaluating the utility of a persons life by the contribution that life makes to 
society one aspect could be good citizenship. That quality can be measured by criteria such as 
law abidance and voluntary work. I have not yet seen examples of such measures. When the 
utility of a life is measured with its effect on the environment, consumption is a relevant 
aspect. There are several measures of ‘green living’. It is less easy to quantify moral value. 
Though it is not difficult to see that some people's lives stand out, there are no tools to rate 
the common man.  
On some criteria we have better information at the aggregate level. Wackernagel's 
(1999) measure of ecological footprint indicates the degree to which citizens in a country use 
irreplaceable resources. Patent counts per country give an idea of the contribution to human 
progress and state participation in UN organizations could be seen as an equivalent of good 
citizenship.  
Unlike the foregoing qualities of life, there have been no attempts to measure utility 
comprehensively. The obvious reason is that the criteria are too vague and varied. Utility is 
easier to conceive than measured.  
  
Comprehensiveness is less of a problem when utility is measured subjectively. We can then 
assess the degree to which someone thinks of their life as useful. There are several 
questionnaires that measure subjective sense of meaning. Chamberlain and Zika 1988 review 
some of these).  These questionnaires do not measure actual usefulness of life, but rather the 
person's satisfaction with his perception of the matter. Though these feelings may have some 
reality basis, the measures say more about the subjective appreciation of life; because the 
utility of ones life is so difficult to grasp, judgment is easily overshadowed by how much one 
likes or dislikes life12. 




3.2.4   Measures of appreciation of life 
It is easier to measure the subjective appraisal of life. Since this is something people have in 
mind, we can simply ask them 13. Interrogation is mostly done by direct questioning via an 
interview or a written questionnaire. Since the focus is on 'how much' the respondent enjoys 
life rather than 'why', the use of qualitative interview methods is limited in this field. Most 
assessments are self-reports in response to standard questions with fixed response options. As 
well as numerous single items, there are various questionnaires. Incidentally, subjective 
wellbeing is assessed by less obtrusive methods, such as analysis of diaries and projective 
tests.   
Contents  Many of these measures concern specific appraisals such as satisfaction with ones 
sex life or perceived meaning of life. As in the case of life-chances, these aspects cannot be 
meaningfully added in a whole, firstly because satisfactions cannot be assessed exhaustively 
and secondly because satisfactions differ in significance. Yet humans are also capable of 
overall appraisals. As noted earlier, we can estimate how well we feel generally and report on 
that. So, encompassive measurement is possible in this quality quadrant. 
There are various ways to ask people how much they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. One 
way is to ask them repeatedly how much they enjoy it right now, and to average the 
responses. This is called 'experience sampling'. This method has many advantages, but is 
quite expensive. The other way is to ask respondents to estimate how well they feel generally 
or to strike the balance of their life. Almost all the questions ever used for this purpose are 
stored in the 'Catalog of Happiness Measures', which is part of my 'World Database of 
Happiness' (Veenhoven 2000a). 
 Questions on enjoyment of life typically concern the current time. Most questions 
refer to happiness 'these days' or 'over the last year'. Obviously the good life requires more 
than this, hence happiness must also be assessed over longer periods. In several contexts we 
must know happiness over a lifetime, or better, how long people live happily. Remember the 
above discussion of this criterion in the context of biology and system theory. 
At the individual level it is mostly difficult to asses how long and happy people live, 
because we know only when they are dead; however, at the population level the average 
number of years lived happily can be estimated by combining average happiness with life-
expectancy. For details of this method see Veenhoven (1996). 
 
Limitations? There are doubts about the value of these self-reports, in particular about 
interpretation of questions, honesty of answers and interpersonal comparability. Empirical 
studies, however, show reasonable validity and reliability, for the details see Veenhoven 
(1996:19-22, 1998) and Schyns (in preparation).  
There are also qualms about comparability of average response across cultures, and 
hence about the above-mentioned estimate of happy years of life. It is claimed that questions 
are differently understood and that response bias differs systematically in countries. These 
objections have also been checked empirically and appeared not to car any weight. Many of 
these checks are reported in Veenhoven (1993). 
 In this case there is no problem of summation, the answer to the question about 
appreciation of life-as-a-whole suffices.  
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CAN QUALITY OF LIFE BE MEASURED INCLUSIVELY? 
 
As noted in the introduction, terms like 'quality-of-life' and 'wellbeing' were circulated to 
denote overall worth of life. Hence the introduction of these terms was followed by attempts 
to measure the goodness of life comprehensively. We have considered the meanings 
addressed by these inventories in section 2.1. All assess overall quality of life by summing 
different merits and in these summations the qualities discerned are merged. This adding of 
apples and pears yields a great variety of fruit salads, each with their special flavor and 
devotees. Unfortunately this trade makes little sense. 
 
Why cross-quadrant sum-scores make no sense 
Firstly, three of the four separate qualities in my scheme cannot be measured compre- 
hensively. Above I have argued that exhaustive assessment is not possible in the cases of 
livability, life-ability and utility of life. Only happiness can be measured completely, 
because it is an overall judgment in itself. Where most of the components are incomplete, the 
sum cannot be complete either. Hence, sum-scores are always selective, and therefore say 
more about a good life than about the good life. 
 Secondly, one cannot meaningfully add ‘chances’ and ‘outcomes’. A happy and 
productive life is no better when lived in a perfect environment by an well-endowed person, 
than when realized in difficult circumstances by someone handicapped.  
 Thirdly, sum-scores fail to appreciate the functional relationships between the 
qualities of life discerned. The value of environmental opportunities depends on personal 
capacities. An orchestra may be well equipped with violins, but if its members are horn 
players the musical performance will still be poor. Likewise, the worth of life-abilities 
depends on the environmental challenges for which they are needed. It is their fit that counts, 




rather than the mere amounts.  
These contingencies are acknowledged in some concepts, for instance, Gerson (1976) 
defines quality-of-life as harmony of self-interest and 'transcendent' utility. Yet this is easier 
said than measured. Firstly, such harmony can hardly be quantified, for instance, the fit of 
individual and environmental potentialities cannot be observed as such, at best we can infer 
fit from resulting enjoyment of life. Secondly, there is mostly not one best fit, but several 
fitting configurations, for example collectivist and individualistic arrangements can be 
equally harmonious but still represent quite different qualities.  
The above problems could partly be met if one restricted to the few conditions and 
capabilities of which the mutual fit can be estimated, for instance if we focus on sheer 
material subsistence. This is close to the 'basic needs approach', which is said to have formed 
the basis of the Human Development Index (UNPD 1990). Yet the HDI does not really solve 
the problem either. 
 
Why there is most in happiness 
When human capacities fit environmental demands, there is a good chance that human needs are 
gratified. Only bad luck or willful deprivation can block that outcome. Gratification of basic 
needs will manifest in a stream of pleasant experiences. Biologically this is a signal that we are in 
the 'right pond'. In human consciousness this manifests in good mood, and subsequently in 
satisfaction with life as a whole. 
 So, happiness is both a merit in itself, and indicative of good life-chances. Subjective 
happiness implies two things: Firstly that the minimal conditions for humans thriving are 
apparently met, secondly that the fit between opportunities and capacities must be sufficient. 
Hence happiness says more about the quality of life-chances that the sum-scores do.  
 This means that at least three of the four qualities of life can be meaningfully 
summarized by the degree and duration of happiness. This is how the good life is 
characterized in the closing sentence of many fairy tales: "They lived long and happily".  
 
Why happiness is not all 
The proposed fourfold matrix visualizes the main limitation of that view, ignoring the utility 
quadrant. As noted above, a life can be happy but not useful or useful but not happy. Though 
these qualities often go together, they do not necessarily so. 
   
 
5.     DISCUSSION 
 
Use of this taxonomy 
This exercise started with a discussion of the confusion surrounding words for 'the good life'. 
As a remedy I proposed a fourfold matrix classification of the qualities of life. This taxonomy 
was used to clarify the substantive meanings denoted by current words and measures. This 
worked, though it was often not possible to place current notions in one particular quadrant. 
One can see this as a weakness, i.e. the scheme does not fit current concepts, or as strength, it 
denotes new meanings.  
Now there are more classifications of quality of life, which are also used to structure 
this complex field. In section 2.3 we have reviewed a few. Is this one any better? It would be 
too much to review all the alternative classifications. Let it suffice to note that the mayor 
distinctions in the field are between  'objective' and 'subjective' qualities and along 
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disciplinary kinds; e.g. economic, social and psychological wellbeing. A great advantage of 
the proposed fourfold matrix is that it makes more sense theoretically. The distinction 
between 'chances' and 'results' positions the merits in a functional perspective, the distinction 
between 'livability' and 'life-ability' brings the contingencies to mind. As such, this taxonomy 
helps us to see that overall quality of life cannot be seen as summed merits, but must rather 
be conceived as merit-configurations. 
 
Elusive utilities  
In this taxonomy the ‘utility’ quadrant is the most problematic. The criteria are quite diverse 
and elusive. One can see use in anything. Contrary to happiness there is no link with demands 
of human nature. The matter is in fact unmeasurable.  
In an earlier paper on this subject I therefore left the category out. This left me with a 
simpler three-step scheme of 1) livability, 2) life-ability and 3) life appreciation. (Veenhoven 
1999).  This is in line with the utilitarian idea that the ultimate value is in the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. Bentham will nod in his glass case.  
 Though clear cut, that 3-step scheme misses an important class of qualities. That is, 
the values that override sheer functionality and enjoyment. It is not possible to weave these 
meanings in as contributions to the happiness of other people, because many of them have no 
effect on happiness. The best I can do is acknowledge the existence of these many qualities, 
and mark the morass on my map. Without forewarning we get stuck in it over and over again. 
 
Significance of happiness 
I concluded that the most comprehensive measure for quality of life is how long and happy a 
person lives. Though happiness was not proclaimed as the only quality criterion, it was 
presented as the best available summary indicator. Note that this is not a statement of belief, 
but a conclusion based on assumptions about the nature of happiness. 
I acknowledge that subjective appreciation of life is not all, because happiness does 
not guarantee that other possible values are met. That latter position must be nuanced in two 
ways: both in favor and against.   
 The favorable nuance is that happiness and utility do go together quite often. Both 
outcomes draw on the same opportunities. Useful living also requires tolerable environmental 
conditions and fair individual capabilities, in many cases similar ones to happiness. Further, 
objective utility is at least partly reflected in subjective awareness, and as such is part of the 
appraisal of life as-a-whole14.  
 In contrast, subjective enjoyment of life is not always appropriate in the given 
conditions. Though happiness works as a compass, it is not always an infallible tool for 
orientation. I do not deny that happiness results sometimes from cognitive distortion or 
chemical intoxication. Still, this is the exception rather than the rule, and in the long run 
dysfunctional happiness will destroy itself. So this problem applies more to short term 
happiness than to happy life years.  
 
Guide for research 
The taxonomy does more than just map different qualities of life. It can also be used to help 
explore their interrelations. The first step is to distinguish qualities of life as different 
phenomena; the next steps will be to chart causal effects. As such the scheme suggests 
interesting research lines. One thing we can determine is those conditions for happiness that 
also promise desirable external effects. Since there are probably more ways to happiness, we 
can then select the most ‘useful’ one.  





6.        CONCLUSION 
 
One cannot meaningfully speak about 'quality of life' at large. It makes more sense to 
distinguish four qualities: 1) livability of the environment, 2) life-ability of the person, 3) 
utility of life for the environment, and 4) appreciation of life by the person. These qualities 
cannot be added, hence sum-scores make little sense. The best available summary indicator is 
how long and happily a person lives.  
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NOTES 
1 The World Health Organization defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing".  
 
2  In the Netherlands in the 1970's, the 'limits to growth'movement used the slogan 'not welfare,  but wellbeing' (In Dutch:
Geen welvaart maar welzijn). In this context, the capriciousness of the term is emphasized.
Interestingly, the term was soon taken over by social workers, who came to call their services 'wellbeing work' .
Hereby, the term wellbeing came to denote a very limited  meaning, in fact far more limited than economic welfare,
which denotes all goods and services produced in society. Still the suggestion of encompassivenes remained,  
much to the pleasure of  the profession.
 
 
3  For an overview of the various definitions of 'quality of life' see: Fernandes-Ballesteros (1996). 
 A review of definitions of happiness can be found with Veenhoven (1984: 16-17 ) 
 4  In sociology, the term 'life-chances' is used in the more limited meaning of 'environmental  opportunities', here called 
'livability, and in that context mostly for a set of social opportunities, access to scarce resources.  
 5  There are three main meanings or health: The maxi variant is all the good (WHO definition),  the medium variant is
 lifeability, and the mini-variant is absence of physical defect. 
 
6  A problem with this name is that the utilitarians used the word utility for subjective appreciation of life, the sum of 
 pleasures and pains. 
 
7  Frankl's (1946) logo-therapy aims to make people believe in sense they do not see. 
 
8  This quality-of-life is the subject of the Journal of happiness Studies 
 
9  This analogy fits to the extent that the profit of a firm also reflects the degree to which functional demands for the  
business are met. Yet unlike functional needs for human functioning these demands are not fixed genetically  and
nor are they linked so close to affect like signals. 
 
10  'Doing interesting things' can also be seen as a quality in itself, especially when the person does not like it. In this  
interpretation this item should be placed in the meaning quadrant, because it represents some kind of perfection. 
 
 11 The well known Bar-on (1997) EQ-tests measures positive mental health. 
 
12 This is commonly referred to as the top-down’ effect in evaluations of life. See e.g. Diener (1984) 
 13 Subjective wellbeing is also inferred from non-verbal cues, such as smiling, and from signs of despair such as suicide 
and excessive risk taking. Unfortunately, these 'objective' indicators appear to fit subjective feeling rather badly. 
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Physical measures are not available; the 'hedometer'  still waits for invention.
 14 The effect of perceived meaningfulness on happiness will be particularly great if there is an innate need for meaning
 fulness. Some scholars believe so, but others see the search for meaning rather as an 'unintended' byproduct of human 
consciousness, which is not strongly linked to hedonic experience (cf. Wentholt 1975).
 
